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H
hatred Hatred, the noun, and to hate, the verb, do not
completely coincide in their semantic ranges. Hatred
carries with it more intensity and greater seriousness
than many of our most common uses of the verb.
Hatred is unlikely to apply aptly to one’s feelings about
broccoli, though it would be perfectly normal to register
one’s aversion to it by saying ‘I hate broccoli’. In daily
speech, hate can be used to indicate a fairly strong but
not very serious aversion to a film, novel, or food, all the
way to desiring, with varying seriousness, the extermination of an entire people. The word hate can thus mark a
powerful moral/immoral *sentiment, or merely register
a negative *preference. In this it tracks Latin usage,
where the verb, odi, and the noun odium, can be used
to register both simple aversion and also an intense
passion of all-consuming detestation.
Attempts to get at the substance of hatred in the
philosophical tradition focus mostly on how to distinguish it from *anger. Both anger and hatred accompany
and inform relations of hostility, but not in quite the
same way. Following Aristotle, the usual view is that
anger is tied up with claims for redress against a particular person for particular wrongs, whereas hatred
need no personal involvement; we can hate a person
for what or who he or she is even without knowing
them. Thus whole groups can be hated. Aristotle (384–
322 bc) gives thieves and informers as examples. The
grim history of the 20th century would add whole
peoples based on religion, ethnicity, or race. Anger,
Aristotle says, is curable and can be repaired via compensation, revenge, or apology. Unlike anger, which can
exhaust itself within moments, hatred decays slowly if at
all; it endures. The angry man might feel pity, says
Aristotle, but not the hater; for the angry man wants
the person he is angry at to suffer, while the hater wants
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him not to exist. Roughly then, anger is about acts,
hatred about the mere existence of the hated.
Folk wisdom, not incorrectly, sees a link between
*love and hate, each tied up with the other, not just as
opposites but also as marking the roil and turmoil of close
relations. It is disputed whether both can be co-experienced, though a good portion of the world’s best known
literature and not a little of our own experience would be
incomprehensible if they could not be. Their relation is
not symmetrical: hatred does not bring about the conditions for love, though love (spurned, betrayed) can readily supply the conditions for hatred. Both hatred and love
share a focused intensity; both, strangely, involve caring.
Both love and hatred are held to be character defining for
those who feel them, with hatred maybe beating out love
in this regard, for it seems we derive as much (or more) of
our sense of who we are from our hatreds as from our
loves. Thus it may be that though haters want their
objects dead, they may find they need to resurrect them
or reinvent them in order to maintain their own sense of
self: to wish, in Othello’s idiom, the hated one a thousand
lives so he can keep on killing him.
Many of the distinctions between anger and hatred
break down on closer inspection. We can hate individuals no less than groups. Consistently being angered by
someone can lead to hate, and hate can easily trigger
anger.
Darwin (1809–82), with his usual perspicuity, recognized that hatred mixes and mingles with other closely
related sentiments depending on the relative status of
the parties. Hatred for the lowly is not just tied up with
disgust and contempt but disgust and contempt may in
fact be the form hatred of the low takes. Hatred of the
high by the low, he says, is closely annexed to fear, if not
also a form of it. Nietzsche’s (1844–1900) well-known
account is that morality itself owes its very being to a
particular form of hatred the weak have for the strong:
ressentiment. But the genocides of the 20th century have
shown that hatred has an even more remarkable transformative power: it allows the strong to invest the weak
with magical and phantasmal powers of control, insinuation, infection, and pollution. A true history of hatred
would have to come to terms with anti-Semitism.
Much routine hatred is experienced less as an emotion than as a quasiformal attitude of opposition, of
obligatory enmity. And, when experienced as an emotion, hatred may never exist uncoloured variously by
anger, disgust, contempt, fear, envy, competitiveness,
and all-consuming love. For this reason too it has not
been studied systematically in the scientific way anger
has; it encompasses too many disparate inner states and
outer settings for traditional psychological experimentation to get at. Even the most brilliant of philosophers
despair. Thus David Hume’s (1711–76) observation: ‘’Tis
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altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred’.
W. I. MILLER

